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  ﻣﻠﺨﺺ
                                                          ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﻭﺭﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﺎﺌﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘـﺔ ﺒﺠـﺫﻭﺭ ﺃﺯﻤـﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﻁـﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻤـﺼﺭﻓﻲ، ﻜﻤـﺎ ﺘﻘـﺩﻡ 
           ﻭﺒﺎﻹﻀـﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟـﻰ  .                      ﻠﺒﻨﻭﻙ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﺍﻻﺴـﺘﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﻟﻲ                                ﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺠﺩﻴﺩﺓ ﺘﺘﻌﻠﻕ ﺒﺄﺜﺭ ﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻭﻤﺔ ﻟ 
                                                                 ﺫﻟﻙ ﺘﻨﺎﻗﺵ ﺍﻟﻭﺭﻗﺔ ﺒﺩﺍﺌل ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺅﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻤﻨـﻊ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴـﻑ ﻤـﻥ ﺍﻵﺜـﺎﺭ 
                                                          ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺠﻤﺔ ﻋﻥ ﺃﺯﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻤـﺼﺭﻓﻲ، ﻭﻗـﺩ ﺘﻭﺼـﻠﺕ ﻨﺘـﺎﺌﺞ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴـﺔ ﺇﻟـﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻤﻠﻜﻴـﺔ 
        ﻠﻔﺘﻬـﺎ ﻋﻠـﻰ                                                     ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﻭﻙ ﺘﺅﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺯﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﺤﺘﻤـﺎل ﻭﻗـﻭﻉ ﺍﻷﺯﻤـﺎﺕ ﻭﻜـﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﺭﺘﻔـﺎﻉ ﺘﻜ 
                  ﻭﻗـﺩ ﺍﻗﺘﺭﺤـﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﺭﻗـﺔ ﻋـﺩﺓ  .                                           ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﺯﻨﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭﻟﺔ؛ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻤﻥ ﻀﻌﻑ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻷﺨﻴﺭﺓ 
                                                    ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﻤﻥ ﺸﺄﻨﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﻑ ﻤـﻥ ﻭﻗـﻭﻉ ﺍﻷﺯﻤـﺎﺕ، ﻟﻌـل ﻤـﻥ ﺃﻫﻤﻬـﺎ ﻀـﺭﻭﺭﺓ ﻭﺠـﻭﺩ 
                                                                ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻗﻭﻴﺔ، ﻭﺒﻨﻴـﺔ ﺃﺴﺎﺴـﻴﺔ ﻤﻨﺎﺴـﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻁـﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻤـﺎﻟﻲ، ﻭﻜـﺫﺍ ﺇﺠـﺭﺍﺀﺍﺕ 
   .                             ﻰ ﺍﻤﺘﺼﺎﺹ ﺍﻷﺯﻤﺎﺕ ﺒﺩﻻﹰ ﻤﻥ ﺠﻌﻠﻬﺎ ﺘﺘﻔﺎﻗﻡ                          ﺘﺠﻌل ﺍﻟﻭﺤﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺭﻓﻴﺔ ﻗﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﻋﻠ

I. Introduction 
In the last two decades, developing countries from Argentina 
to Zambia have endured banking crises. Since banks intermediate 
most of the funds in these economies, banking 
crises are especially challenging for developing countries. 
When banks fail, credit is likely to contract and the payment 
systems may collapse. Consumption, investment, and, 
consequently, economic growth typically deteriorate. Also, crises 
might undermine the authorities' ability to conduct fiscal or 
monetary policies. The use of public money to recapitalize 
problem banks can seriously handicap efforts to control budget 
deficits, especially given the immense burden that banking crises 
can signify to governments. Serious banking problems can also 
create difficulties for monetary policy. They may not only distort 
the normal relationships among monetary instruments and targets, 
but also compromise the overall stance of monetary policy. 
By now, an extensive literature exists examining the origins 
of banking Crises and the policy options to prevent them (see 
Demirguy-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 1999, and 2000), 
Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Goldstein and Turner (1996), 
Kaminski and Reinhart (1996, 1998), among others). In particular, 
the following factors have been identified in the literature as the 
key determinants of banking crises: (i) macroeconomic shocks, 
(ii) sharp increases in short-term interest rates, (iii) lending booms 
(iv) currency mismatches, (v) inappropriate incentive structures 
(e.g., presence of ill-designed deposit insurance schemes), (vi) 
financial liberalization, (vii) weak institutions and inadequate 
legal infrastructure, (viii) external economic conditions, (ix) the 
exchange rat regime, and (x) poor bank management. 
Even though in the 1990s many countries embarked in the 
privatization of government enterprises including ban, 
government ownership of banks is still prevalent around the 
world. According to data collected by La Iota, Lopes de Silages, 
and Heifer (2000), in an average country in 1995, 42 percent of 
the equity of the 10 largest banks was owned by the government 
(down from 59 percent in 1970). Despite the fact that government 
ownership or control of banks is so widespread, little research 
exists on the impact of this phenomenon on the incidence and cost 
of crises(1). 
This paper has three objectives. First, in Section II, this study 
surveys the literature and empirical evidence on the determinants 
of banking crises. The paper then conducts an empirical analysis 
of the role of public ownership of banks on the likelihood and cost 
of banking crises in Section III. Finally, in Section IV, the study 
reviews the policy measures that can help reduce the likelihood of 
crises, as well as minimizing their costs should they occur. 
A key finding of the paper is that greater state ownership 
tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises and raise their 
fiscal costs as wall. However, the limited number of observations 
for the costs of crises - and the difficulty in estimating these costs- 
suggests that the latter result be viewed as tentative. Getting 
governments out of their ownership role and focusing their efforts 
                                           
1    -  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000) and La Porta, Lopes de Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2000) arc exceptions. but in both cases the investigation of 
the relationship between government ownership and crises wasnot the  
primary focus. 
on provision of financial sector infrastructure and regulation 
would seem to be key for lessening the likelihood of banking 
crises, and should help stimulate development as well 
 II. The Determinants of Banking Crises 
 
Research on the causes of banking crises strongly suggests 
that these episodes can be the result of a confluence of factors(1). 
Macroeconomic shocks can affect bank solvency in a number of 
ways. A major recession, a decline in the tonus of trade, a sharp 
drop in asset prices, or other negative shocks to national wealth 
can reduce the profitability of bank borrowers and lead to a rise in 
bank non-performing loans and an erosion of bank capital. 
 Sharp increases in short – term interest rates can affect the 
health of the banking system via at least two channels(2). high real 
interest rates can reduce banks profits or produce losses, since 
typically the asset side of bank balance sheets is comprised of 
longer maturity instruments at fixed interest rates. Moreover, high 
interest rates make loan repayments harder. for debtors and 
adversely affect banks by increasing non-performing loans. As a 
consequence, a sharp increase in short-term rates is likely (0 he _I 
significant contributing factor to systemic banking sector 
problems. 
                                           
1-  See HIS (1996), Demirgii_-Kunl and Detraglache (l99g, 1999, <lnd 
2000), Eid1cngrecn and Rose (1998), Gavin and} Lausanne (! 996), 
(,Goldstein and Turner (1996), Kaminski and Reinhart (1996,1998), 
and Linden's et al. (1996) for more on this. 
2    -   A sudden rise in interest rates could be the result of a number of factors 
such as a rise in the inflation rate, the need to defend from a 
speculative attack, a change in monetary policy towards a more 
restrictive stance, the elimination of interest rate controls, etc. 
Lending booms can also put pressure on the health of the 
banking system. In particular, periods of rapid credit growth may 
weaken the capacity of banks to carefully screen borrowers, thus 
causing bad loans to increase. 
 Currency mismatches that take place when banks borrow in 
foreign currency and lend in domestic currency can increase bank 
fragility by exposing banks to unanticipated exchange rate 
movements. Even if banks hedge their foreign currency positions 
by lending in that currency, they can still be impacted by 
devaluations to the extent that their borrowers remain unheeded. 
 The presence of a deposit insurance scheme can also 
contribute to a banking crisis. In this respect, the theory does not 
provide a clear causal link between deposit insurance and banking 
crises. On the one hand, self-fulfilling crises -as described by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983)are less probable when deposits are 
insured. On the other hand, banking crises owing to adverse 
shocks can become more likely as managers opt for riskier loan 
portfolios in the presence of deposit insurance. 
 The process of financial liberalization may present banks 
with new risk that without the proper precautions can negatively 
affect the stability of the banking 'sector. More specifically, 
financial liberalization allows banks to undertake new lines of 
business and make new, unaccustomed investments. Unless the 
supervisory and regulatory frillworks are strengthened before 
financial markets are liberalized, bank supervisors may havoc 
neither the resources nor the training needed to adequately 
monitor and evaluate the new activities or banks. 
The stability of the banking sector may be compromised if 
the institutional and legal structure in which banks operate is 
weak. For example. inadequate accounting standards or poor 
intonation disclosure will prevent investors, depositors, and bank 
supervisors from being able to discipline or monitor bank 
performance. Similarly, if the Cigar system does not facilitate the 
pledging of collateral by debtors and its seizing by banks when 
necessary, then the cost of credit losses and the cost of borrowings 
may be high. Filially, if bank supervisors lack the power to 
enforce prudential regulations and close insolvent hanks, then they 
will be unable to prevent or punish excessive bank risk-taking 
behavior. 
 External economic conditions can also contribute to 
honking sector problems, particularly in developing countries. For 
instance, a sharp increase in industrial country interest rates can 
reduce the inflow of foreign funds, thereby leading to an ballot 
decline in the level or growth of banks' funding. Similarly, a sharp 
economic slowdown in industrial countries or deterioration in the 
terms of trade can also contribute to banking problems in 
developing countries, once again by diminishing the flow of funds 
to these economies. 
The exchange rate regime in place can also affect the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. A popular argument in favor of 
fixed exchange rates is that a commitment to a currency peg may 
reduce the probability of banking crises, as it would discipline 
policy makers (Eichengreen and Rose (1998». Put differently, the 
restrictions imposed by the objective of maintaining an exchange 
rate anchor would discourage the propensity towards erratic 
policies and, therefore, minimize the occurrence of domestic 
shocks that lead to banking crises(1). Furthermore, as argued by 
Calve (l999b) random shocks that affect economies may be a 
function of the exchange rate regime. Thus, the transparency and 
credibility associated with fixed exchange rates may insulate a 
country from contagion and rumors. 
Proponents of fixed exchange rate regimes also consider the 
presence of dollar debt as an argument supporting the adoption of 
pegged exchange rates (Velasco and Cesspits (1999). They argue 
that a nominal devaluation will drastically increase the burden 
faced by debtors and can generate a wave of corporate 
bankruptcies. This may, in turn, result in a banking crisis, as banks 
see their stock of non-performing loans rise. Calve (1999a) also 
supports this conjecture and claims that, "Iiability-dollarized 
economies are highly vulnerable to a devaluation". 
The traditional argument for supporting the adoption of 
flexible exchange rate systems is that they offer the possibility of 
a more stabilizing monetary policy. Accordingly, the exchange 
rate could be used to absorb some of the real shocks the economy 
faces and could reduce the burden on the interest rate. More 
precisely, confronted with an adverse external shock, floaters can 
let the exchange rate bear the bnmt of the adjustment so interest 
rates need not be raised. Thus, output is protected through 
                                           
1-  a related argument put forward by Mish kin and Salvation (2000) is 
that countries lacking political and economic institutions to support an 
independent central bank may find hard rags a sensible: second best 
strategy for monk     
increased competitiveness and more favorable financial 
conditions(1). 
Defenders of floating exchange rate regimes also contend 
that pegged exchange rates provide implicit' guarantees for those 
looking to borrow in foreign currency, giving rise to a moral 
hazard problem. To sustain the peg(2), authorities will insist that 
there is absolutely no prospect of it being changed: In this way, 
the government offers the private sector an insurance against the 
risk of exchange rate changes. This situation attracts capital 
inflows, but :Isaacs the economy very 
vulnerable to external shocks(3) Moreover, under pegged 
regimes, borrowers have little incentive to hedge their foreign 
exposures (Eichengreen and Houseman (1999)). On the other 
hand, exchange rate risk under nexible regini_s promotes hedging 
and helps to curb minnows. 
 Advocates of the nexible regime also argue that fixed 
exchange rates severely constrain lender of last resort operations, 
since domestic credit growth may undermine the confidence in the 
currency peg.7 The lack of a lender of last resort under fixed 
                                           
1- This argument is, of course, not applicable to those countries with 
significal1tliability dollarization. 
2- Indeed, many analysts considered this channel as onc of thc m:ljor 
contributing factors 10 the Asian crises, and concluded that "the peg did 
it". However, as was pointed out by Calvo (1998), if the crisis countries 
had floatcd their excha.tlge rates prior to the crisis, their currencies 
would likc:ly have appreciated, not depreciated 
3- It could be argued that the use of fiscal policy in lieu of" monetary policy 
to help troubled banks might he: a reasonable alternative. However, 
since developing countries arc onen rationed at times of crises, it is not 
feasible for thc govcrnmcnt simply to b(1[TOW against the present 
value of future tf1x receipts' and thcn hand over the moncy to the 
bank'ers (Velasco. 1999) 
exchange rates can, in turn, encourage bank runs and financial 
panics (1) (2). 
As interest on the determinants of banking crises resurfaced 
during the 1990s,. the empirical literature on this subject grew. 
One strand of the literature uses logit or probit models to analyze 
the determinants of banking crises, while the second strand focusb 
on identifying leading indicators of such episodes. 
Eichengreen and Rose (1998) and Demirgu9-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 1999, and 2000) are among the most widely 
quoted studies in the first strand of the literature. Demirgii9-Kunt 
and Detragiaehe (1998) estimate a multivariate logit model to 
examine the determinants of banking crises in a large sample of 
developed and developing countries over the period of 1980-97. 
Their findings suggest that a weak macroeconomic environment 
(characterized by low growth and high inaction), as well as 
periods of high real interest rates, make banking crises more 
likely. Moreover, they observe that both deposit insurance and lax 
legal 'enforcement increase the probability of banking crises. 
Dcmirgii9-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) have also shown that 
                                           
1- It should he noted that there is no unanimity uver this argument. Some claim that 
the lender oflast resort function can be rented-contingent credit lines 
(Dornbusch, 199R). Others contend that thc poliJy of contracting a line of 
credit 
has the following shortcomings (Velasco, J 999). First, the risk of bank runs 
need' not be easily diversifiab1e for lenders in the wake of regional or global 
contllgion. Second, such contracts arc diflitult to write and enforce, owing 10 
the obvious potential for moral hazard. Third, the issue size of the credit may 
110t be sufficient to cover a 
reasonable portion of the banking sector liabilities at a reasonable 
premium 
2-  Indecd, as Hausmann cl al. (1999) indicate, this is exactly what happened in 
Venezuela during the first half of t 994 
financial liberalization can engender financial fragility to the 
extent (hat the supervisory, legal. 
and regulatory framework for banks to deal with the new 
regime are not in place. In their most recent study analyzing the 
links between deposits insurance and banking system stability, 
the .authors find that explicit deposit insurance schemes tend to 
increase the likelihood of banking crises, in particular where bank 
interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is 
weak. Also, certain design features of deposit insurance schemes 
can exacerbate the adverse effects on bank stability. In particular, 
the likelihood of crises is higher the more extensive is the 
coverage of deposits and in countries where the scheme is funded, 
and where it is run by the movement rather than the private sector. 
 Eichengreen and Rose (1998) examine the detenninants of 
crises in a sample of developing countries only. Their results show 
that banking crises in emerging markets take place in response to 
unfavorable developments in domestic and international markets. 
Their strongest finding, by far, is the association between high 
industrial country interest rates and banking crises in developing 
countries. Put differently, an increase it! foreign interest rates 
raises the probability of banking crises in developing countries by 
undermining the availability of offshore funding for the banks(1). 
 Also using a logit methodology, Domay and Martinez Peria 
(2000) examine the impact of the exchange rate regime on the 
likelihood of banking crises in a sample of 88 developing 
                                           
1- More specifically, they find that a one percent increase: in Northern interest rales 
is! associated with an increase in the: probability of Southern banking criscs 
of around three percent 
countries over. the period 1980-97. Furthermore, the authors 
evaluate whether the exchange rate regime affects the cost and 
duration of crises. Overall, the authors find that fixed exchange 
rate regimes are associated with lower probability of crises, but 
higher costs (in terms of output losses) if a crisis does unfold. 
 The most widely known studies on the leading indicators of 
banking and currency crises include Kaminski and Reinhal1 
(1996) and Kaminski, Lozano, and Reinhart (1998). The main 
findings from these papers can be summarized as follows: 11rst, 
these studies 'find recurring patterns of behavior in the period 
leading up to banking and currency crisps. Second, banking crises 
seem to be somewhat more difficult to forecast accurately than 
currency crises. 111is can be attributed to the fact that banking 
crises also depend Oil various micro characteristics of the banking 
industry and of the official safety ne!. Third, changes in equity 
prices, real interest rates. real: output. export prices, and money 
multipliers arc among the best leading indicators of honking 
crises(1)." 
Banking Crises and the Role of Government Ownership of Banks 
Proponents of government ownership of banks argue that 
governments can better allocate capital to highly productive 
investments, in particular when institutions i are not well 
developed (Gerashchenko 1962). Also, they argue that 
government ownership should be encouraged since private 
                                           
1- A related study in this strand of the literature by Roja-Suarez (199R). 
including both macro and bank level data, develops a bank-bastd early 
warning system for emerging markets. The application of the: 
proposed bank-based caddy warning indicators 10 Latin America 
suggests that spreads between deposit ion's lending rates exhibit a 
high degree of accuracy in predicting banking problems. 
ownership may result in excessive concentration and in limite1 
access to credit by many parts of society. Finally, failures such as 
those of Barings and Long Term Credit Management have led 
some to believe that private banks are more concerned with 
gambling than with allocating resources wisely. 
On the other hand, those opposed to government ownership 
of banks contend that, by allowing political motives to distort all 
aspects of bank operations, government ownership may play an 
important role in causing banking crises. Frequently, politicians 
use public banks as a vehicle to extend credit to given sectors or 
interest groups. In those cases, the creditworthiness of the 
borrowers does not play an important role in the credit decision. 
Thus, not surprisingly, loans of state banks all too often become 
non-performing. Also, those against government ownership argue 
that public banks tend to have lower incentives to innovate, to 
identify problem loans at an  early stage, and to control cost, since 
they frequently have their losses covered by the government, they 
confront limited competition, and they are often shielded from 
closure on constitutional grounds (Goldstein and Turner (1996). 
Despite increased privatization in the last decade, public 
township of banks reams significant and pervasive around the 
world. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this fact. In a sample of 64 
countries, the average share of assets of the top To banks owned 
or controlled by the government was 51 percent in 1970,44 
percent in 1985, and 33 percent in 1995(1). "In 1970, the share of 
                                           
1- THE countries included are: ?Algeria, Argentina Australia, Austria, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cole divine::, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, EJ Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, 
bank assets owned by the government was larger than 50 percent 
in 34 out ,of a total of 64 countries This Nul1)beer was 25 in 1985 and 16 
in 1995. Both of these statistics are higher if we consider only developing countries. 
For this group or countries, the government in 1995 controlled 40 . 
Percent of bank assets and 13 out of 43 developing countries 
exhibited shares of government ownership larger than 50 parent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Izard, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Portaging, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela 
 Though public banks remain a fixture of banking systems in 
devF1oping countries, there is little empirical evidence on their impact 
on the likelihood and cost of crises. Two exceptions are Berth, Capri, 
and Levine (1999) and. a Portal, Lopez de Silages, and Heifer (2000). Using a data 
set including more than 60 countries, the first study examines the links between 
different regulatory/ownership practices and both financial-sector performance and 
banking system stability. Among other things, the authors find that on average, the 
_eater the share of bank assets controlled by state-owned banks, the lower the level 
of financial development as well as the development of the non-bank 
sector and the stock market. Regarding the impact of government 
ownership of banks on the likelihood of banking crises, tile authors did not find any 
significant effects. However, their estimations should be considered preliminary, 
since they only consider recent (i.e., 1997) intonation on government ownership 
rather than a time series for this variable. Also, the authors only control for a small 
set of factors ,that can potentially affect the likelihood of crises. 
Using a sample of 92 countries, La Portal, Lopez de Silages, 
and, Heifer (2000) find that higher government ownership of 
banks is associated with slower financial development, lower 
subsequent growth of per capita income, and longer growth of 
productivity. Aside from examining the correlation between the 
extent of government ownership and the likelihood of crises, (he 
authors do not explore this subject in their study. 
Using the information on government ownership assembled 
by La Portal, Lopes de Silages, and Heifer (2000), we examine the 
impact of this variable on the likelihood and severity of banking 
crises. Our sample includes 64 countries (43 developing) over the 
period 1980-1997. We distinguish between systemic and non-
systemic crisps. Following Dernirguy-Kunt and Detragiache 
(19n), we decline as systemic crises episodes that meet one of the 
following four criteria: (i) the non-performing loans ratio (to 
tntalloans) is above 10 percent; (ii) the cost of the. banking crisis 
is at least 2 percent of GDP; (iii) the crisis led to (he 
nationalization of banks; and/or (iv) emergency measures such as 
deposit freezes or prolonged bank holidays are adopted  in 
response to the crisis. 
Table I shows the probability of banking crises conditional 
on the share of public ownership being below or above 50 percent. 
Also, this table displays tests of whether these proportions or 
probabilities are the same. For all countries and for developing 
countries, we find that the probability of a banking crisis is larger 
in those countries where the share of bank assets owned 
 
by the government is larger than 50 percent. On the other 
hand, we find no differences in probabilities when we consider 
only developed countries   
To examine the relationship between the severity of crises 
and the degree of government ownership of banks, we calculate 
the mean cost of crises (both in terms of the fiscal cost and the 
cost in terms of foregone output) for those cases where the share 
of bank assets in the hands of the government is above and below 
50 percent. These descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
Data on the fiscal cost of crises (relative to ODP) come from 
Hoonah and Lingerie (2000). The real output cost was calculated 
as the differences between the average growth rate of real ODP 
during each crisis episode relative to the average growth during 
tranquil times. Allowing for a two-year window around banking 
crises (to accommodate for the possibility that crises may have 
started earlier and ended later than identified in the literature), ,we 
define output growth during tranquil periods as the average 
growth of output in the two years surrounding the window 
described above(1)." According to the results in Table 2, we can 
never reject the null that the average cost of crises' is the same 
regardless of the extent of government ownership.  
Because the 50 percent threshold is an arbitrary one, Table 3 
examines the relationship  between government ownership of 
banks and the likelihood and cost of banking crises by means of 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. In general, we find a 
positive and significant relationship between the occurrence of 
banking crises and the extent of government ownership of banks. 
There is some evidence that the larger the share of bank assets 
owned by the government the smaller the cost of crises in terms of 
foregone output growth. I There is no significant relationship 
between the fiscal cost of crises and the extent of movement 
ownership of banks 
Since the tests conducted so far are university, the results 
discussed may change once we  control for the impact of other 
variables on the likelihood and cost of crises. To address this 
issue, we use legit analysis to estimate the probability of a banking 
i crisis and ordinary least squares to analyze the cost of these 
                                           
1- We tried other donations of the output losses associated with banking crisp, 
but results did not change significantly 
episodes. We focus on a sample o( 43 developing countries over 
the period 1980- 995.  
Table 1. The Likelihood of Banking Crises and Government 
Ownership of Banks (no-parametric tests) 
 All 
countries Developed
Develo
ping 
Prob (Banking Crises/ share of assets owned by the 
government > 50%) 
8.33 4.44 9.52 
Prob (Banking Crises/ share of assets owned by the 
government < 50%) 
4.95 4.8 5.1 
Test of equality of proportions (Ho: proportion (x) – 
proportion (y) = diff=0) 
2.1 -0.137 2.146 
p-value (95% confidence level) 0.036** 0.891 0.0318
** 
    
Prob (Systematic Banking Crises/ share of assets 
owned by the govt> 50%) 
6.8 1.11 8.5 
Prob (Systematic Banking Crises/ share of assets 
owned by the govt> 50%) 
3.5 1.7 4.8 
Test of equality of proportions (Ho: proportion (x) – 
proportion (y)=diff=0) 
2.326 -0.393 1.876* 
p-value (95% confidence level) 0.02 0.69 0.06 
Table2. The Cost of Banking Crises and Government 
Ownership of Banks (non-parametric tests) 
 All 
countries Developing 
Cases Where the share of bank assets owned by the 
government > 50% 
  
Average cost of crises in terms of foregone output 1.86 2.14 
Average fiscal cost of crises (% of GDP) 14.22 15.61 
Cases where the share of bank assets owned by the 
government < 50% 
  
Average cost of crises in terms of foregone output 3.25 3.52 
Average fiscal cost of crises (% of GDP 14.2 18.28 
   
Test Of equality of means for the cost of crises in 
terms of foregone output  
1.58 1.18 
P- value (95% confidence) (0.12) (0.25) 
Test of equality of means for the fiscal cost of crises 0.004 0.44 
p-value (95% confidence) (0.99) (0.67) 
 
 
Table 3. Spearman's Rank Correlations (pvalue for test of 
independence in parentheses ) 
% of Bank Assets Owned by 
the Government 
 
All countries Developing 
Banking Crises 0.057* 0.075* 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
Systematic banking crises 0.078* 0.071* 
 (0.02) (0.08) 
Cost of crises in terms of foregone output 
growth 
-0.41** -0.32* 
 (0.01) (0.08) 
Fiscal cost of crises (% of GDP) -0.005 -0.064 
 (0.97) (0.75) 
Note: *and** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent 
levels, respectively. 
The dependent variable in the logit analysis is a dummy that 
equals zero in years and countries where there are no crises and it 
equals one during crisis periods. Once again, here we distinguish 
between systemic and non-systemic crises. Given the! logistic 
distribution, the probability of a banking crisis in period t can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the probability of no crisis in period t is: 
 
 
 
 
 
X is a matrix of determinants of banking crises. In OUT estimations, only the. 
first year of a crisis is coded as a one and the crisis observations beyond the first 
year are excluded. We adopt this strategy to avoid the endogenously problem that 
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would result from the fact that once the crisis starts, it is likely to affect the 
evolution of the macro and financial Variables on the right hand side. Similarly, to 
minimize simultaneity problems, all repressors in the legit models are lagged one 
period. 
The variables included in X are dictated by the theory on the 
determinants of banking crises. We provide a detailed list of 
variables and Sautés in the data appendix. Aside from the share of 
bank assets owned by the government, we include three types of 
variables in our estimations, namely: domestic-macroeconomic, 
external, and financial. In this regard, we closely follow the 
empirical specification on the likelihood of banking crises in 
Oemirguy-Kunt and Oetragiaehe (1998). Among the domestic 
macroeconomic variables we include the real growth of GOP, the 
level of real GOP per capita, the inaction rate, and the real interest 
rate(1)." 
Adverse macroeconomic conditions hurt banks by increasing 
the spare of non-performing  loans in the economy. Thus, we expect an 
increase in the real growth of GOP to reduce the probability of a banking crisis. On 
the other hand, we expect higher real interest rates to have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of crises. High inflation is associated with high nominal interest rates and 
may also be viewed as a proxy for poor macroeconomic management. Therefore, we 
expect high inaction countries to be more crises prone. Finally, real GOP per wapiti 
is included to control for the fact that poor countries typically have inefficient legal 
systems, as well as weak 
enforcement of loan contracts and deficient prudential 
regulations. We expect an increase in GOP per capita to lower the 
probability of a banking crisis. 
                                           
1- We also conducted some estimations including the budget surplus/deficit as 
a pe1rcentagc of GO?, but since this variable was never significant and 
it considerably reduces the number of observations. we report the 
results excluding this variable. The results including the budget 
surplus/deficit to GDP arc available upon request 
We allow a number of financial variables to enter into the 
logit estimations. In particular, we include the ratio of M2 to 
reserves, the ratio of private domestic credit to GOP, the growth of 
credit,  the ratio of foreign liabilities to foreign assets held by 
banks, and the retro of cash held by banks to assets. The ratio of 
M2 to foreign exchange reserves is supposed to capture the 
exposure that banks face to runs associated with currency crises. 
Oemirgii_-Kunt and Oetragiache (1998) argue that financial 
liberalization may weaken the condition of the banking sector 
because this process may. result in an increase in risk-taking 
opportunities, and when not appropriately regulated, in instances 
of fraud. Pill and Parham (1995) argue that the ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector to GOP can be utilized to capture the 
extent of financial liberalization. (1) We include this variable in our 
I estimations to control for this effect. Also, because a number of 
studies (Gavin and Houseman (1996), outreaches et al. (1999» 
have argued that banking crises are associated with lending 
booms, we include the growth rate of domestic credit in the logit 
estimations.  
The ratio of cash (to total bank assets) held by banks is 
introduced to capture the ability of banks to deal with potential 
runs on their deposits. We include the ratio of foreign liabilities to 
foreign assets held by banks to examine the extent to which banks' 
currency mismatches affect the likelihood of a banking crisis(2). 
                                           
1- also conducted some estimations using a dummy for financial liberalization 
periods (following Ikmirgfi(fKunt and Udragiachc (1998)), but 
reduces our sample of countries significantly and does not affect the 
empirical results 
2- The ratio of foreign liabilities to foreign assets used here (see appendix for 
definition and sources) is only a proxy for the true currency mismatch, since it 
 To capture the external conditions that countries face, we 
include two variables: the change in the terms of trade and the 
ratio of net capital flows to GOP. A deterioration in the terms of 
trade is expected to increase the likelihood of a banking crisis, 
since it would negatively affect the ability of borrowers (in 
particular those in the tradable sector) to reap loans. Both net 
outflows 
 
 
 
 
and inflows could play an important role in precipitating 
banking crises. A rise in capital flows intennediated by the 
domestic banking system is likely to increase the 'supply of loan 
able funds at banks' disposal, thereby allowing banks to engineer a 
lending boom. As is widely aclrnowledge'd, lending booms lead to 
financial vulnerability by contributing to an endogenous decline in 
                                                                                                                         
only considers the liabilities held by b_nks with foreigners (i.e., non residents) 
and the banks' claims on foreigners, irrespective of (hc currency of 
denomination. There arc a number of obvious dcliciencies with this measure. 
First, for some developed countries hank assets and liabilities with foreigners 
may in fact be denominated in the domestic currency. in which case, this! 
ratio does not really capture the currency mismatch of banks. However, 
because our sample is primarily comprised' of developing countries, we do not 
expect this to be a significant bias. Another potential problem with this ratio is 
that it excludes the foreign assets and liabilities held by banks with domestic 
residents. In many developing countries_ banks take dollar deposits and make 
dollar loans. Tn those cases, our measure will underestimate the currency 
mismatch since jl only includes obligations towards and claims on non-
residents. We made attempts to collect data on foreign currency deposit and 
loans held by residents. but we were only able to collect a very limited data 
set. 
the quality of banks' assets. (1) Outflows, on the other hand, can 
bring about crises by depriving banks of foreign financing and 
also by heightening the expectation of a meltdown, leading to 
bank runs. Calve and Reinhart (1999) argue that "sudden stops" or 
episodes of inflow reversals can trigger output collapses and 
severely damage financial sectors. 
We investigate the link between the exchange rate regime 
and banking crises, by introducing a dummy that equals one if a 
country is under a fixed exchange rate regime and zero otherwise. 
 To capture the impact of government ownership on the 
likelihood 6f crises, we use the data collected by La Portal, Lopez 
de Silages, and Heifer (2000) on the shale of assets of the top ten  
banks in a given country owned by government of that country. 
Data on this variable is only available for 1970,1985, and 1995. (2) 
Table 4 examines the impact of government ownership on 
the likelihood of banking crises (including systemic and non-
systemic crises), while Table 5 focuses exclusively on systemic 
crises. All estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for 
within-circuitry autocorrelation. (3) 
 Both the estimations that focus on all crises and those for 
systemic crises, indicate that capital flows and high ratios of M2 
                                           
1- There are several reasons why this holds true. First, banks have limited 
capacity to evaluate projects. Second, regulatory agencies have 
limited monitoring capacity and resources. Finally, the supply of 
"good" projects with high expected returns relative fo their variance is 
limited (see Gavin and Houseman (1996)) 
2- Therefore, we use the 1970 value for (he period I ()80_ 1984, the 1985 value for 
the period 1985.1994, and the 1995 malodor the period 1995-97 
3- See Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982) and Rogers (1993) 
to reserves have a positive and significant, impact on the 
likelihood of crises. On the other, countries with higher GDP per 
capita and, therefore, more developed  institutions face a lower 
probability of enduring a banking crisis. Finally, exchange rate 
stability appears to reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
The first model in Table 4 and Table 5 (model (4.1) and 
(5.1)) shows that the share of bank assets owned by the 
government has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood 
of banking crises. This is time whether we focus all episodes or 
bank ullsoundi,ess or only on systemic crises. 
Table 4 The impact of Government Ownership of Banks on 
the Likelihood of Banking Crises in Developing Countries 
(Systemic and non – systemic crises are included) 
Model  
)4.1( 
Model  
)4.2(  
Model  
)4.3( 
Model  
)4.4( 
Model  
)4.5( 
Model  
)4.6( Variables 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Inflation t-I -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0060 -0.0069 -0.0058 -0.0051 
 -(1.33) -(1.36) -(1.16) -(1.34) -(1.14) -(0.75) 
Terms of trade t-1 0.0127 0.0118 0.0129 0.0128 0.0121 0.0339 
 (0.69) (0.61) . (0.69) (0.70) (0.66) (1.76) . 
Real interest rate t-I -0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0065 -0.0074 -0.0063 -0.0050 
 -(1.41) .(1.44) -(1.24) -(1.42) -(1.23) -(0.69) 
M2 over reserves t 1 0.0019 0.0017 0.0022 0.0018 0.0018 0.0309 
 (2.05)" (1.91)' (2.47)" (2.07) .. (2.02)" (1.55) 
GDP Der caDita t-I .0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 -(1.94) . -(2.07) ..  -(1.93)' -(1.92)' -(1.87)' 
Real GDP .rowth t-l 0.0871 0.0845 0.0820 0.0887 0.0911 -0.0170 
 (1.47) (1.39) (1.39) (1.43) (1.49) -(0.26) 
Growth of rcal credit t-1 0.0018 0.0003 0.0027 0.0018 0.0015 0.0035 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.25) (0.16) (0.13) (0.28) 
. Crcdit to GDP t-I 0.0023 0.0024 0.0019 0.0023 0.0023 0.0205 
 (0.84) (0.90) (0.71) (0.84) (0.84) (0.71) 
Cash to bank assets t-1 -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0060 -0.0087 0.0292 
 -(0.55) -(0.56) .(0.58) -(0.56) -(0.80) (1.57) 
Ratio ofunhed.ed liabilities t-I -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0041 
 -(0.18) -(0.06) -(0.56) -(0.18) -(0.35) -(0.22) 
Canital flows to GDP t-I 0.0334 0.0298 0.0352 0.0338 0.0294 0.0002 
 (1.34) (1.22) (1.43) (1.34) (1.09) (0.19) 
Govermnent ownershin of banks t-I 0.0140 0.0179 0.0184 0.0138 0.0178 0.0161 
 (2.36)" (2.29)" (3.02)" (2.36)" (2.30)" (1.79)' 
(Gov. ownershio ofbanks.1980s dummy) 1-1  -0.0051     
  -(081)     
Gov. ownershin of banks. aDP Der ciiDita) t-1   0.0000    
   .(1.38)    
Gov.ownshn. o[banks.dummv 
for<20%l!ov.ownshn) t-I    -0.0094   
    -(0.33)   
Gov.ownsho otbanks.sharconoans to thenublic 
sectod t-\     -0.0002  
     -(1.38\  
Dummv for counlries under an exchane rate 
PCg) t-I -0.8972 -0.7917 -0.8692 -0.8888 -0.8357 -1.3818 
 -(2.17) .. -(1.9R)" .(2.11) "1 -(2.12)" -(1.98)" -(2.01)" 
Dummv for eXDlicit denosit insurance) 1-1      0.1173 
.      (0.16) 
(Dummv for financial liberalization) (-I      0.3025 
      (0.48) 
Dummy for caDital accounlliheralization) I-I      0.2158 
      (0.38) 
Constant       
 -2.9197 -2.9596 -3.2399 -2.9072 -2.9292 -3.8505 
 -(4.35)" -(4.33) .. -(4.96) .. , -(4.42) .. -(4.38) .. -(3.81) .. 
Number of observations 434 434 434 434 434 279 
Pseudo R-squared 0.098 0.1 0.091 0.098 0.1 0.096 
The dependent variablc is a dummy that equals I during periods of systemic or 
non – systemic banking criscs and zero otherwise. All observations following the 
first year of crises are dropped. 
*** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 5. The Impact of Government Ownershipo on Banks 
Likelihood of Systematic Banking Crises in Developing Countries. 
Model  
)5.1( 
Model  
)5.2(  
Model  
)5.3(  
Model  
)5.4( 
Model  
)5.5( 
Model  
)5.6( Variables Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Inflation t-I -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0064 -0.0072 -0.0052 -.0079 
 -(1.34) -(1.34) -(1.20) -(1.35) -(1.00) -(0.76) 
Terms of trade t-1 0.0115 0.0115 0.0114 0.0 11 5 0.0111 0.0315 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.56) (0.54) (1.55) 
Real interest rate t-I -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0069 -0.0077 -0.0058 -.0048 
 -(1.42) -(1.42) -(1.28) -(1.43) -(1.08) -(0.49) 
M2 over reserves t 1 0.0018 0.0018 0.0021 0.0017 0.0017 0.0291 
 (1.96)' (1.96)' (2.36)" (1.96)" (1.87)' (1.46) 
GDP Der caDita t-I -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 -.0001 
 -(1.77)' -(1.75) '.  -(1.76)' -(1.71)' -(1.55) 
Real GDP .rowth t-l 0.0741 0.0716 0.0662 0.0739 0.0782 -.0470 
 (1.17) (1.18) (1.09) (1.16) (1.24) -(0.78) 
Growth of rcal credit t-1 0.0009 0.0009 0.0018 0.0009 0.0003 0.0050 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08)' (0.02) (0.34) 
. Crcdit to GDP t-I 0.0016 0.0016 0.0013 0.0017 0.0016 0.0336 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.48) (0.61) (0.59) (1.39) 
Cash to bank assets t-1 -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0149 -0.0147 -0.0198 0.0291 
 -(1.17) -(1.17) -(1.21) -(1.17) -(1.45) (1.76)' 
Ratio ofunhed.ed liabilities t-I -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 .0.0003 -0.0006 .0.0010 
 -(0.35) -(0.36) -(0.71) -(0.34) -(0.62) -(0.05) 
Canital flows to GDP t-I 0.0467 0.0469 0.0483 0.0473 0.0420 0.0003 
 (2.14)" (2.15)" (2.25)" (2.13)' (1.84)' (0.32) 
Govermnent ownershin of banks t-I 0.0127 0.0125 0.0169 0.0124 0.0190 0.0160 
 (2.07)" (1.54) (2.66) .. (2.D4) .. (2.42)" (1.71)' 
(Gov. ownershio ofbanks.1980s 
dummy) 1-1  0.0003     
  (0.04)     
Gov. ownershin of banks. aDP Der 
ciiDita) t-1   0.0000    
   -(1.20)    
Gov.ownshn. o[banks.dummv 
for<20%l!ov.ownshn) t-I    -0.0132   
    -10.46)   
Gov.ownsho otbanks.sharconoans to 
thenublic sectod t-\     -0.0003  
     -(1.93\'  
Dummv for counlries under an 
exchane rate PCg) t-I 0.8447 -0.850. -0.8142 -0.8331 -0.7483 -.3160 
 (2.04) ,(2.05) -(1.97)" -(1.99)" -(1.73) -(1.85) 
Dummv for eXDlicit denosit 
insurance) 1-1      0.1075       (0.14) 
(Dummv for financial liberalization) (-I      0.3519 
      (0.50) 
Dummy for caDital 
accounlliheralization) I-I      0.3558 
       
Constant 2.7417 2.7394 -3.0460 -2.7233 -2.7422 -3.9771 
Number of observations -(3.96) -(3.96 -(4.5t).. -(4.01) -(4.00) .. -(3.76). 
 434 434 434 434 434 279 
Pseudo R-squared 0.092 0.092 0.OR6 0.092 0.1 0.096 
The dependent variablc is a dummy that equals I during  periods of systemic 
or non – systemic banking crises and zero otherwise. All observations following the 
first year of crises are dropped. 
*** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
The second model in both Table 4 and Table 5 (model (4.2) 
and (5.2)) investigates whether the responsiveness of the 
probability of a banking crisis to increases in the share of bank 
assets owned by the government changes between the) 980s and I 
990s. We examine !his issue by interacting a durum that equals 
one during the 1980s with the share of bank assets owned by the 
government. Since this interaction term is insignificant, we 
conclude that there is no J-dance of the relationship between 
ownership and the likelihood of crises changing over the last two 
decades. 
In the third model of Table 4 and Table 5, we investigate 
whether the impact of government ownership changes at different 
levels of income, where this variable is measured by aop per 
capita. In principle it is possible that countries with higher atop 
per capita, and most likely better institutions and enforcement of 
contracts, are less likely to suffer from the negative aspects of 
government ownership of banks. In particular, in countries with 
solid institutions and therefore lower levels of Compton, it is less 
probable that government owned banks become a conduit through 
which certain sectors (not necessarily the most efficient ones) are 
favored. While the empirical results indicate that at higher levels 
of atop per capita government ownership of banks has a smaller 
impact on the likelihood of crises, this effect is not significant at 
the conventional levels of significance. 
It is possible that the impact of government ownership on the 
likelihood of banking crises depends on whether this variable is 
above or below a certain threshold. In most developed countries 
the median share of bank assets owned by the government is 
approximately 12 percent. In models (4.4) and (5.4), we examine 
the impact of the interaction M the ownership variable with a 
dummy for whether the country is below the 20 percent threshold. 
Though we find that being below the developed country threshold 
reduces the impact of government ownership on the likelihood of 
crises, this effect is not statistically significant.  
In the second to last model of Table 4 and Table 5, we 
examine whether the percentage of bank loans that are directed to 
the public sector affects the impact of government ownership. If 
loans to ice public sector are diverted to unprofitable, poorly 
performing projects, then a high concentration of lending to the 
public sector might increase the likelih9od of banking crises. On 
the other hand, it is possible that lending to the public sector might 
postpone crises if these funds arc recycled as liquidity for ailing 
banks(1). 
Both in the estimations including all banking crises and in 
those far the systemic episodes only, we find that the share of 
loans to the public sector tends to reduce the adverse effect of 
government ownership of banks on the likelihood of crises. 
However, this effect is not statistically significant. Finally, the last 
column in Table 4 and Table 5 shows that the impact of 
government ownership of banks on the likelihood of crises is 
robust to controlling for other institutional factors, like whether 
the financial sector and the capital account have been liberalized, 
and whether the country adopted an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme. 
                                           
1-  Note that the banks may be no less insolvent, but the realization of a crisis 
could be postponed. 
An issue of concern when analyzing the impact of 
government ownership of banks on the likelihood of banking 
crises, is the potential for reverse causality. In other, words, it is 
possible that rather than precipitating banking crises, increases in 
the share of batik assets owned by the government are purely a 
response to these episodes. In the estimations conducted so far we 
have tried to minimize this possibility by lagging the share of 
bank assets owned by the government one period. In Table 6, we 
conduct two other sets of estimations in order to test the 
robustness of our results to alternative ways of dealing with the 
potential endogenously problem. The first two COIW11I1S of 
Table 6 (models (6.1) and (6.2» present estimations for the 
likelihood of banking' crises in general and for  systemic crises 
excluding those countries where bank nationalizations occurred following banking 
crises(1). Finally, in models (6.3) and (6.4), we replace the first with 
the third lag of the government ownership variable. In all cases, 
we find that the share of bank assets owed by the government 
continues to havoc a positive and sib'llificant effect on the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. 
To study whether the share of bank assets controlled by the 
governjlnent affects the cost of banking crises, we estimate the 
following equation using ordinary least squares 
 
 
where i denotes a banking crisis episode 
Cost refers, alternatively, to the fiscal or real output cost (i.e., 
the cost in terms of forgone output growth) of a crisis. Z is a 
                                           
1-  According to Capri and Kingfield (1999), these countries include Indonesia, Korea; 
Jamaica, Mexico, and Paraguay. 
)3(Re* 1,1,1,, ititititi sOwnershipGovernmentzCost Σ++∂++= −−− hµα
matrix of macro and financial variables measured the year before 
crises. In particular, the following variables are included in the,specifications: 
inflation, real interest rates, lending growth, and bank credit to the private sector to 
GDP(1) This matrix also 
includes the lag of the peg dummy. Finally, Rees is a matrix 
containing dummies for the different resolution mechanisms 
implemented by governments to overcome crises, In particular, 
using data collected by Honohanand Lingerie (;2000), we identify 
episodes when: the government provided liquidity suppOrt to 
banks, when forbearance was extended to multiple institutions, 
and, finally, crises episodes where the government extended 
blanket guarantees to depositors. 
                                           
1-  Other specifications with a larger number of macro variables were nm, but 
given the limited number of  observations and because the remaining 
variables were not significant, we only report those described above. 
Table 6. The Impact of Government Ownership on Banks 
Crises in Developing Countries- Robustness Test (Systemic and 
non- systemic crises are included) 
Model  
)6.1( 
Model  
)6.2(  
Model  
)6.3( 
Model  
)6.4( 
Variables All Crises 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Systematic 
Crises 
Coefficient 
(t=stat) 
All Crises 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Systematic 
Crises 
Coefficient 
(t=stat) 
Inflation [-I -0.0080 : -0.00764 -0.0055 -0.0053 
 -(1.37) -(1.45) -(1.18) -(1.10) 
Terms of trade ,-I 0.0015 0.0065 0.0101 0.0069 
 (0.05) (0.27) (0.47) (0.29) 
Real interest rate (-I -0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0060 -0.0058 
 -(1.46) , -(LS4) -(1.26) -(1.19) 
M2 over reserves t-l 0.0014 : 0.0016 0.0014 0.0013 
 (1.45) (1.61) (LSO) (1041) 
GDP per capita ,- I -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 -(1.63) -(1.81). -(2.19)" -(1.96). 
Real GDP prowth t- I 0.0592 0.0806 0.0762 0,0553 
 (0.82) (1.15) (1.20) (0,86) 
Growth of real credit t- I -0.0088 -0.0058 0.0087 0.0074 
 -(0.66) -(0.46) (0.69) (0.55) 
Credit to GDP t- I 0.0009 00017 0.0027 0.0020 
 (OJ3) (0.62) (1.02) (0.74) 
Cash to bank assets I-I -ON I I -00205 -0.0081 -0.221 
-- -(1.87). -(0.95) -(0.55) -(1.40) 
Ratio ofunhc:d!:!cd liabilities (-I -0.0012 -(JOn08 -0.0006 -00002 
-     
 -(1.11) -(084) (0.59) (021) 
Caoit.1 flows to GDP t-I 0.0449 0.0279 0.0109 0.0291 
 (2.03)" (1.07) (O.J7) (1.20) 
Government ownc:rshin of banks t-1   0.0156 0.0141 
   - -  
   (2.40) .. (2.09) .. 
(Gove:rnme:nt oW!H.'rshif ban-h) t.J  ,0.-0108 -  
 0.0096    
     
 (166). I (1.87).   
(Dummv ror countries under an exchance: rate: Dcr) t-I -0.6907 -0.7413 -0.8090 -0.7389 
 -( 1.74) . -( 1.91)' -(187) . -( 1.74)' 
Constant. -1.9473 -2.3241 -3.0574 -2.7783 
 -(265) .. i -(2.95) H -(4.13).' -{J.76).. 
Number of observations 382 382 J9h 396 
Pseudo R-sauared 0.09 0.088 0.1 0.094 
*** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Table 7. the Impact of Government Ownership of Banks on 
the Cost of Banking Crises. 
Model  
)7.1( 
Model  
)7.2(  
Model  
)7.3( 
Model  
)7.4( 
Model  
)7.5( 
Model  
)7.6( 
Foregone output cost of crises Fiscal cost of erises  Variables 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Inflation T-1 -0.0101 -0.0095 0.0903 -0.0660 
-
0.0644 
-
0.0087 
 (1.81)' (1.67)' (2.23)' -(0.77) .(0.68) -(0.10) 
Real interest rate t-l -0.0638 -0.0633 .0.0515 . 0.0768 0.0738 
-
0.0145 
 .(1.04) -(1.05) -(0.87) (0.56) (0.48) -(0.10) 
. Growth of real credit t-I 0.0105 0.0105 0.0126 0.5037 0.5031 0.4500 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (1.83)' (1.79)' (1.71) 
Credit to GDP t-I 0.0254 0.0116 0.0165 0.2027 0.2203 0.2532 
 (0.61) (0.22) (0.31) (1.47) (091) (2.07)' 
Government ownership of banks t-1 -0.0391 -0.0388 -0.0311 0.1063 0.1083 0.1380 
 (1.64) -(1.69)' -(1.24) (1.10) (1.09) (1.64) 
Gov.ownshn. of banks.dwnmv 
for<200/0l£ov.ownshD) t-1  0.1096   -0.1207  
  (0.57)   -(0.12)  
(Dummy for countries under <m exchane rate 
PCIl) t-1 3.3036 3.0940 4.2141 7.9559 7.9767 7.3069 
 (2.50)" (2.01) .. (2.00)' (1.13) (1.11) (1.03) 
Forbearance   1.4736   8.9396 
   (0.70) .  (1.39) 
Liauiditv SUDDort   .0.8087   3.8155 
   -(0.52)   (0.51) 
Guarantee   0.9666   -8.7233 
   (0.44)   -(1.08) 
Constant 2.3128 2.7212 -0.7622 .8.5876 -9.2389 -16.0836 
 (0.88)  -(0.26) -(0.85) .(0.73) -(1.66) 
Number of observations 30 30 18 23 23 20 
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.5 0.63 
* ** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent level. Respectively. 
Table 7 presents OLS estimates for the cost of crises. Across all 
specifications, we fine! that government ownership or banks seems to 
reduce the output losses associated with crises, but increase the 
fiscal costs. Because the number or observations is small and the 
coefficients on the government ownership variable are not 
significant for the must part, these estimations should be 
considered preliminary and their results should be taken wilt 
caution. 
IV. Preventing and Mitigating Crises 
The review of rectors behind crises and our empirical 
findings suggest a path for government officials who want to 
prevent or at least mitigate the impiety of banking crises. A first 
step is to develop financial infrastructure, (1) which is needed by a 
healthy financial system. Better information and contracting will 
lead to broader financial sector development and, in particular, a 
greater role for equity finance relative to debt and less 
dependence ,on bank finance. One reason why institutional 
underdevelopment and especially a poor legal environment are 
found to be conducive to crises is that they lead to greater 
dependence on banking and hence a more lopsided financial 
system. When state ownership is present, the demand for better 
infrastructure is especially weak and its absence can forestall the 
development of the; banking system and of nonblank institutions." 
Rather than investing significant amounts in state-Owned banks, 
governments would be better served by greater investments in 
infrastructure(2). Such government actions would not only help the 
banking system in the future, but, more importantly, they would 
improve the nonblank financial sector and give residents the 
                                           
1- As used in World Bank (forthcoming, 2001), the tcnl1 "financial infrastructure" I 
is intended to capt1;lre the framework of rules and systems within \which 
tirms and households plan, negotiate, and perform fin-uncial transactions. As 
such, it would include: legal and regulatory structures (including rule and 
contract enforcement mechanisms); supervisory resounds and practices; 
information provision (e.g., accounting an auditing rules and practices, credit 
bureaus, rating agencies, public registries); liquidity facilities; payments and 
securities settlement systems; and exchange systems (e.g., trading and listing 
services, trading rules, communication and inf°f!T1ation platforms). 
2- In fact, Berth, Capri, and Levine (2000) show that greater state ownership 
leads to less nonblank financial sector development. 
possibility of getting better financial services from private, 
nonblank intermediaries. 
Second, there is no substitute for sound macro policies, 
meaning no_ only ;hose that do not add to volatility, but also 
actually dampen it. Without these policies, inflation will be 
higher, thereby driving out long-term debt and leaving the 
corporate sector -and therefore the banks with more fragile 
balance sheets. Sound macro policies entail avoiding ending 
booms, which is ultimately the responsibility of the central bank, 
and thereby lessening the scope for a subsequent  bust. They also 
include paying attention to the exchange rate and liquidity 
policies. As shown by Dome and Martinez Persia (2000), if the 
currency is pegged, the risk of _rises is lower, but these episodes 
tend to be more severe. Therefore, the authorities have to be 
especially vigilant against exchange rate misalignments. If the 
government adopts a flexible exchange rate, then the goal must be 
to lessen 'Jean against the wind' behavior when a domestic boon1 
yields asset values that arc detached From underlying economic 
fundamentals. 
Banking crises are often preceded by deposit runs and/or a 
drying up of liquidity in the interbrain market. Both banking 
regulations and macroeconomic policies should be consistent with 
an adequate liquidity policy to deal with unexpected crises that 
can destabilize_ the payment systems.  In this sense, a policy of 
requiring banks to meet certain prudent liquidity ratios and of 
securing contingent credit lines from abroad may be a wise course 
of action. 
Third, incentives induced by the regulatory framework in the 
financial system should be designed so that the sector acts as a 
shock absorber, rather than a magnifier of risks. In most 
 countries, the safety net under the banking system -
principally lender of last resort facilities and explicit or implicit 
deposit insurance- encourages greater bank dependence and hence 
less stability. In practice, greater state ownership has often 
functioned like a blanket deposit Insurance. Instead, governments 
should avoid this type of unconditional insurance and design 
safety nets to encourage healthy balance (debt-equity, and 
banking/non-banking), effective risk management, and oversight 
of banks by owners, markets, and intermediaries. For countries 
emoting out of a period of control, attention to the incentive 
framework and the safety net will help ensure better-sequenced 
financial liberalization, thereby again lessening the likelihood of a 
crisis from this source. 
Key lessons on deposit Insurance design (reviewed in World 
Bank, 200 I) are to limit  coverage (to 1-2 times per eapita GOP, 
consistent with the perceived 'need to protect small depositors); 
keeping the deposit insurance scheme unfunded (but with access 
to funds) in order to encourage market discipline; and involving 
the private sector in ,the management and administration of the 
fund. Private sector involvement can help limit tale reduction in 
market discipline and the impact on systemic risk of an overly 
liberal government scheme. 
Ensuring that bank monitoring is working is a must for 
lessening the odds and costs of crises. With state-owned banks, 
there is no arms-length between the monitors - e set of bureaucrats 
is monitoring another. Moreover, there is no owner who has 
his/her on resources at risk bureaucrats are acting as agents for the 
real owners, the taxpayers. and markets have little ability or 
incentive to mOi1itor, as these banks are perceived to be 
government risk. With private banks, ensuring that owners have 
real capital at stake is a priority, and indeed enforcing evil and 
criminal legal penalties in the event that owners do not behave 
with, the highest fiduciary standards is a way of going beyond 
hinted liability and increasing 'owners' share of the downside risk. 
As far as markets are concerned, large bank creditors, to the 
extent they feel exposed to losses, have clear incentives to monitor 
banks. Recent proposals attempt to capitalize on this incentive by 
forcing banks to issue subordinated debt, that is, a fixed claim that 
is only senior to equity. Not enjoying the upside gains of equity 
holders, but holding almost as much of the  downside risk, 
subordinated debt holders would be highly motivated to police. 
banks for excessive risk taking. Other large creditors -such as 
other banks in interbrain markets- would also be. motivated to 
monitor banks as well, as long as they were not under the 
presumption that they might be 'bailed out' if the bank got into 
difficulties. 
A key to the success of subordinated debt is to ensure that the 
issuers are_ truly at arms-length from the holders of the debt, 
meaning that they neither should be related parties, nor should the 
issuer be allowed to provide comfort or guarantees to the holders. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of doing so, Calamities and Powell 
(2000) note the signs of success of this program in Argentina, and 
World ankh (2001) reviews other evidence that creditors can 
contribute to monitoring (in particular, Schuler and Martinez-
Persia (2000)). 
 Official supervisors are the remaining set of monitors, and 
recent evidence indicates that they provide independent 
information. But it is also crucially important to focus attention on 
the incentive structure for supervisors. As noted in World Bank 
(200 I), supervisors face a skewed 'balance of terror' in a number 
of countries, to the extent that they can be sued for their actions 
and be held personally liable. On the other hand, they can look 
forward to higher income in the future by taking a job with a 
private bank. Thus, they face possibly large liability for tough 
enforcement now, and some chance of deferred gains for friendlier 
supervision. Instead, they need to be immune from civil liability 
for enforcement actions now, and should at the least face loss of 
deferred compensation (such as their pension) if irregularities are 
discovered during rafter their careers. This would be in line with 
the optimal compensation structure long possible to observe their 
actions well, they give them a generous pension - a deferred 
bonus, if you will - but confiscate that bonus if they are revealed 
to have engaged in _isolations of the laws as well as 'best practice. 
 Lastly, the above results suggest that reducing state 
ownership will lower the likelihood and. potentially the fiscal 
costs of banking crises. Indeed, if the government take-Ii more 
seriously its' role as regulator and provider of public goods -
financial sector i1frastructure- getting out of state ownership will 
lessen its own incentive conflict. State owned banks tend not to be 
monitored by either the private or public sector, which is likely 
why they are a danger to  financial stability in addition to being a 
drain on financial sector development. 
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Data Appendix 
Below we list the variables and sources used for this study. 
The data is annual and it covers the period 1980-97.  
• Systemic banking crises dummy: equals one during episodes 
identified _s systemic following the criteria in Demirgiiy-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Source: Caprio and Lingerie 
(1999) and Lindgren et. al (1996) . 
• Inflation: percentage change in the GDP deflator. Source:  
International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, line 99jbir. 
• Terms of Trade Change: Change in the price of exports over 
imports. Source: World Bank, World Tables. 
• Real Interest rate: Nominal interest rate minus inflation 
(calculated as the percentage change in the GDP deflator). 
Source: international Monetary fund, International financial 
Statistics, line 60B. 
• M2: Source: International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, lines (34+35). 
• International Reserves: Source: International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, line 1 ld. 
• GDP per capita: Source: World Bank, World Tables. 
• Real GDP growth: Source: World Bank, World Tables. 
• Domestic credit growth: source: International Monetary 
Fund, Internatonal Financial Statistics, line 32d. 
• Private Credit/GDP: Source: international Monetary fund, 
International Financial Statistics, line 32d divided by line 
99b. 
• Cash/ Assets: Reserves of Deposit Money Banks  / Assets of 
Deposit Money Banks. Source: International. Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, line 20 divided by 
lines (22a+ 22b + 22c + 22d + 22f). 
• Foreign Liabilities / Foreign Assets: deposit money banks 
foreign liabilities to foreign assets Source: International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, lines (26c 
+ 26cl) divided by line 21. 
• Copital Flows to GDP: capital Account plus Financial 
Account + Net Errors and Omissions. Source: International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, lines 
(78bcd + 78bjd + 87 cad). 
• Fiscal cosl oj crises (% of GOP}Source: J lonohan and 
Klingebiel (2000): . Exchange rale peg dl/mmy: equals one 
for those cases when a given country is under a fixed  
• Exchange rate peg dummy: equals one for those cases 
wheen a given country is under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Source IMF classification comes from "Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions" (AREAER). 
• Explicit deposit insurance dummy. Equals one if a country 
has adopted an explicit deposit insurance system. Source: 
Demirguc- Kunt and Detragiache (2000). 
• Financial liberalization dummy: equals one during periods 
of interes rate liberalizations source: Demirgu- Kunt and 
Detragiache (1999). 
• Forbearance dummy: cquals one if the governmcnt cxtcnded 
forbearance in any of the following ways: (i)banks were left 
open in distress (i.e., unable to pay depositors, no access to 
inter-bank market, or widely believed to be insolvent for at 
least three months); (ii) banks were permitted to function 
under existing management though known to be severely 
undercapitalized; and (iii) regulations were relaxed or the 
current regulatory framework was not enforced for at least 
twelve months. Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) .  
• Liquidity mppor/ dummy: equals one if the government 
provided substantial liquidity support . _o insolvent 
institutions. Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) 
• Guarantee "ummy: equals one if the government offered 
explicit or implicit guarantees during the crisis. Source: 
Honohan and Klingcbicl (2000) 
Appendix 
Table A1. Countries and Crises Included, 1980 – 1997. 
Country name Crises Based on demirguc-Kunt 
And Detratgiache (1998) 
Algeria 1990 – 1992 (systemic) 
Argentina 1980 – 1982 (systemic) 
 1989-1990 (systemic) 
 1995 (systemic) 
Australia 1989 – 1992 (non - systemic) 
Austria No crises 
Bahrain No Crises 
Bangladesh 1987 – 1997 (systemic) 
Belgium No crises 
Bolivia 1986-1987 (systemic) 
 1994-1997 
Brazil No in sample 
 1994 - 1996 ( systemic) 
Canada 1983-1985 (non - systemic) 
Chile 1981-1987 (systemic) 
Colombia 1982-1987 ( systemic) 
Costa rise  1987 ( systemic) 
 1994-1997 (non - systemic) 
Cote d'lvoire 1988-1991 (systemic) 
Cyprus  
Denmark 1987 – 1992 (non - systemic) 
Dominican republic No Crises 
Ecuador Not in sample  
 1996 - 1997 (systemic) 
Egypt Not in sample 
 1991 – 1995 (non - systemic) 
El Salvador 1989 (systemic) 
Finland 1991 - 1994 (systemic) 
France 1994 – 1995 (non - systemic) 
Germany No Crises 
Greece 1991 – 1995  (systemic) 
Guatemata Not in sample 
 1993 - 1995 (systemic) 
Honduras No Crises 
India 1991 1997 (systemic) 
Indonesia 1992 - 1997(systemic) 
Ireland No Crises 
Israel 1970s - 1983 (systemic) 
Italy 1990 – 1995 (non - systemic) 
Japan 1992 – 1997 (non - systemic) 
Jordan 1989 - 1990 (systemic) 
Kenya 1985- 1989 (systemic) 
 1993 - 1995 ( systemic) 
Korea 1997  (systemic) 
Lebanon 1988 - 1987 (systemic) 
Malaysia 1982 - 1987 (systemic) 
 1997  (systemic) 
Mexico 1981 - 1982 (systemic) 
 1994 – 1997 (systemic) 
 
Table A1 countries and Crises Included, 1980 – 1997 (continued) 
Country name Crises Based on demirguc-Kunt 
And Detratgiache (1998) 
 Morocco no cnses 
 Nepal 1988 - 1997 (systemic) 
 Netherlands no crises 
 New Zealand 1987 - 1990 (non-systemic) 
 Nigeria 1991- 1995 (systemic) 
  1997 (non-systemic) 
 Norway 1987 - 1993 (systemic) 
 Panama 1988 - 1989 (systemic) 
 Paraguay 1995 - 1997 (systemic) 
 Peru 1983 - 1990 (systemic) 
 Philippines 1981- 1987 (systemic) 
 Portugal no cnses 
 Saudi Arabia no cnses 
 Senegal 1983 - 1991 (systemic) 
 Singapore no cnses 
 South Africa 1985 (systemic) 
 Spain 1970s - 1985 (systemic) 
 Sri Lanka 1989- 1993 
 Sweden 1990 - 1994 (non-systemic) 
 Switzerland no crises 
 Tanzania 1988 - 1997 (systemic) 
 Thailand 1983 - 1987 (systemic) 
  1997 (systemic) 
 Tunisia 1991-1995 (systemic) 
 Turkey 1982 - 1985 (systemic) 
  1991 (non-systemic) 
  1994 (non-systemic) 
 United Kindom J 984 (non-systemic) 
  J 991 (non-systemic) 
  1995 (non-systemic) 
 United States 1980 - 1992 (systcmic) 
 Uruguay 198 I - 1985 (systemic) 
 V cnczucla 1994 - 1997 (systemic) 
 
